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Abstract—We address the need for security requirements to
take into account risks arising from complex supply chains
underpinning cyber-physical infrastructures such as industrial
control systems (ICS). We present SEISMiC (SEcurity Industrial
control SysteM supply Chains), a framework that takes into
account the whole spectrum of security risks – from technical
aspects through to human and organizational issues – across an
ICS supply chain. We demonstrate the effectiveness of SEISMiC
through a supply chain risk assessment of Natanz, Iran’s nuclear
facility that was the subject of the Stuxnet attack.
Index Terms—security requirements, cyber-physical systems,
risk decision-making, supply chains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are a specific-type of
cyber-physical system often used to manage critical infrastruc-
ture such as water treatment and distribution, gas and electric-
ity supply as well as automation and manufacturing. Contem-
porary ICS are complex socio-technical systems that include:
hardware, e.g., programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and
remote telemetry units (RTUs); software to implement the
logic driving such hardware that interacts with the physical
process, e.g., water treatment; and social actors, e.g., humans
and organizations that operate such control systems. The last
20 years have witnessed a steady increase in the number
of cyber attacks on ICS. Examples include Maroochy Water
Services (2000), Stuxnet (2010), German Steel Mill (2014) and
the Ukrainian Power Grid (2015). Such attacks have exploited
vulnerabilities in software, hardware, network architectures as
well as human and organizational aspects.
Consequently, a range of standards and methods for manag-
ing ICS cyber security risks have been developed. Examples
include the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) SP800-82 and SP800-82r2 and the UK Centre for Pro-
tection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) Good Practice Guide
for Process Control and SCADA security. These frameworks
and good practice guides are often used to define security
requriements. However, these standards and methods only
consider the CPS infrastructure in an individual organization
in isolation. They do not take into account how member orga-
nizations of an ICS supply chain assess and manage security
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risks—and how this, in turn, impacts the security requirements.
The supply chain poses substantial cyber security risks, as ICS
components and software are supplied by one or more vendors
and often rely on other outsourced service suppliers. However,
the owner organization of the ICS has little control over the
ICS supplier systems and the risks arising from potentially
varied security practices within the supply chain. Previous
works on ICS cyber security risk assessment have largely
focused on physical and technical issues, neglecting social,
organizational, and human aspects when analyzing, assessing
and managing such risks. Furthermore, systematic approaches
for assessing how cyber security risks from one organization
affect another organization or a whole ICS supply chain have
not been developed.
SEISMiC (SEcurity Industrial control SysteM supply
Chains) has been designed to treat cyber security risks in
a holistic fashion across the supply chain of ICS. In SEIS-
MiC, the ICS supply chain is viewed as a socio-technical
system comprising software, hardware, physical components,
humans and organizations. This ensures that security risks
arising from these various elements are not treated in isolation
but integrated to develop an overall picture that can guide
stakeholder decisions to mitigate risks. Such mitigation may,
for instance, lead to new requirements for implementing secure
software development processes (e.g., SDLC: Secure Devel-
opment Lifecycle), before any 3rd party software or service
providers can be part of the supply chain.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing cyber security risk frameworks for ICS fall into
three main categories: i) international/national standards and
guidelines on ICS cyber security [1]–[3]; ii) quantitative risk
assessment [4], [5]; and iii) attack tree approaches [6]–[8].
Standards provide a high level guidance for improving and
managing cyber security risks in ICS contexts. However,
they lack consideration of the systemic impacts arising from
the supply chain. Quantitative methods provide consequence-
oriented figures on vulnerabilities/threats but the probabili-
ties and impact metrics used are difficult to estimate. Also,
they mainly focus on technical risks, which align with ICS
components and do not address the wider context, such as
social and organizational factors [9]. Attack trees provide a
logical breakdown of all possible paths to an unexpected event.
However, they are limited to the attackers point of view on
the target organization [9]. None of the methods in all three
categories consider cyber security risks from the supply chain.
III. SEISMIC
SEISMiC’s risk assessment approach is based on a socio-
technical view of an ICS supply chain. Specifically, we
adapt and extend an existing socio-technical threat model for
software supply chains [10] with the ICS-specific elements
from the Purdue Reference Architecture (PERA) [11]. As
shown in Fig. 1(a), this ensures that organizations in the ICS
supply chain (including non-ICS organizations with regular IT
systems) are seen as socio-technical systems that interact with
the local ICS organization. Furthermore, SEISMiC’s socio-
technical view of a supply chain organization comprises of
four dimensions: organizational culture, organizational struc-
ture, ICS risk assessment methods and ICS cyber security
technologies. These four dimensions collectively define the
ICS cyber security status of an organization – a change in
one will impact the overall cyber security of the organization
and potentially the supply chain. For example, if technology is
changed, say an organization implements a new authentication
technique for manufacturing operating systems, then culture,
structure and methods may need to be changed. A lack of
cultural change, for instance, may lead to users finding ways
to avoid authentication, hence leaving the system insecure.
Unlike linear models, e.g., ISO 270019 and NIST SP800-
82r2, SEISMiC is a cyclic process (Fig. 1(b)) inspired by
Boehm’s spiral model [12]. Analysts iterate through SEIS-
MiC’s steps, allowing for an incremental and adaptive con-
sideration of cyber security risks in the local (end-user) and
other organizations in the supply chain. Each cycle represents
an organization’s risk process status, starting with the local
(i.e. end-user) organization (cycle 0), peer-to-peer interactions
in one supply chain (cycle 1), whole single supply chain
(cycle 2), and multiple supply chains (cycle 3). There are
four main activities in each cycle: context establishment; risk
identification; risk analysis & tracing; and risk evaluation &
iteration. We discuss these next through an application of
SEISMiC to Stuxnet.
IV. CASE STUDY – STUXNET
We consider Natanz, Iran’s nuclear power plant targeted by
Stuxnet, as the local (end-user) organization.
Cycle 0: Local Organization
Context Establishment: It is necessary to establish the risk
context before analysis, since it helps the organization to scope
and appropriately focus on the subsequent ICS cyber security
risk analysis and assessment process [9]. For example, Natanz
should consider both technical (i.e., PP, ID, CS, MOS in
Fig. 1(a)) and social elements (i.e., human, SC & P, E &
R) as well as possible internal and external influences on
security, such as organizational business goals, security budget,
nation state threats. The context also includes objectives and
constraints such as “protect safe control over centrifuges”.
Risk Identification: ICS cyber security risks are identified
locally using SEISMiC’s socio-technical model. A compre-
hensive list of identified social and technical risks for Natanz
is shown in Fig. 2 (column “Natanz”). Traditional risk as-
sessments mainly focus on technical risks, i.e., level 0 to
4 of SEISMiC’s socio-technical model – physical process,
intelligent devices, control systems, manufacturing operating
systems, and business logistics systems. In contrast, SEISMiC
also considers social factors. In the Stuxnet case, initial
infection began with insecure behaviour towards usage of
removable storage media (i.e. USB drives, which were used
to deliver Stuxnet across the air-gapped network) or malicious
email attachments. Technical vulnerabilities such as weak au-
thentication in MOS and CS level were subsequently exploited,
leading to physical damage to the centrifuges.
Risk Analysis and Tracing: SEISMiC’s recursive risk
analysis integrates context analysis (CA) [13], performance
shaping factor (PSF) analysis [14], and fault tree analysis
(FTA) [15], to understand human and social aspects in or-
ganizations together with technical factors. CA is used to
explain how social and organizational factors affect organi-
zations. PSF analysis focuses on how individual-level factors
influence human performance. The outputs of the CA and
PSF form input to the FTA to analyze the causes that may
contribute to a potential risk. The recursive risk analysis starts
with initial social and technical risk events, which are then
traced toward their consequences, providing a clear causal
relationship between risks and their causes. For example,
insecure human behaviour regarding USB drives at Natanz
can be traced to underlying causes, such as ICS security
culture, values & norms, ICS security knowledge, opportunity
or physical access.
Risk Evaluation and Next Iteration: Following completion
of local risk analysis and assessment, organizations identify
relevant security requirements. They can then decide whether
to plan for a new iteration of SEISMiC. For example, Natanz
analysis reveals that the human error risk is caused by weak
ICS security culture. This, in turn, leads to requirements such
as, clearer security policies on removable storage media and
need for developing a cyber security culture through regular
training and awareness raising.
Cycle 1: Risks in Supply Chain
Context establishment: In Cycle 1, stakeholders in the
supply chain are integrated into the risk context. There are
many stakeholders in the ICS supply chain for Natanz. For
simplification we consider the five stakeholders compromised
by Stuxnet before Nantanz itself: Foolad (ICS system provider
and vendor), Behpajooh (ICS supplier and vendor), Control-
Gostar Jahed (ICS system provider and vendor), Neda (ICS
component supplier), and Kala (ICS manufacturer).
Risk Identification: Similar to Natanz in Cycle 0, risk
identification is done for each organization in the supply chain
(cf. Fig. 2). For example, in order to infect the target, Stuxnet
would need to infect stakeholders in Natanz’s supply chain,
such as malware affecting Behpajooh transferred to Natanz via
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Fig. 1. (a) SEISMiC’s socio-technical model of ICS supply chain (b) SEISMiC’s spiral ICS risk assessment process model
Fig. 2. Security risks in the Natanz supply chain
infected USBs carried by Behpajooh employees for service
update. Malware could also be transferred via any infected
laptop carried over by either Kala’s or Behpajooh’s employees.
By comparing risks with other stakeholders in the supply
chain, Natanz could identify such risks and whether they are
transferable to itself.
Risk analysis, tracing and evaluation. Once such sup-
ply chain risks are identified, Natanz could identify rele-
vant security requirements, e.g., security awareness training
regarding external contractors’ devices, strengthening anti-
malware tools and analysis, enforcing mandatory scanning of
external drives, etc. Alternatively, there could be mandatory
security requirements for suppliers and/or strict service-level
agreements regarding security.
Cycles 2 and 3 These operate in a similar fashion to
Cycles 0 and 1 but enable treatment of a supply chain as an
entity being risk assessed (Cycle 2) and comparison of risks
across multiple supply chains (Cycle 3). For instance, Natanz
could use a Cycle 3 analysis to identify the potentially most
vulnerable supply chain or contrast the levels of risk arising
from different supply chains.
V. CONCLUSION
SEISMiC is a comprehensive and iterative socio-technical
framework for identify security requirements arising from risks
in ICS supply chains. The Natanz case demonstrates that such
a holistic socio-technical perspective can uncover risks from
the supply chain early on, supporting effective risk decision-
making and identification of security requirements.
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